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Introduction 
 
The contextual nature of accounting standard setting processes is well-established in 
the literature, with important studies from Rappaport (1977), Solomons (1978, 1983), and 
Zeff (1978) pioneering notions of the politicisation of accounting standards and observing 
the influence of “outside forces” (Zeff, 1978, p.56) over the standard setting process.  
 
In a recent study, Nichols (2012) asks “Has international oil and gas accounting been 
politicized?”, and considers International Accounting Standards Board’s recent efforts to 
regulate oil and gas accounting via its extractive industries project and the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board’s involvement with this project. This paper addresses Nichols’ 
(2012) question by providing a detailed example of the way in which industry constituents 
participated in the setting of the international extractive industries accounting standard, 
International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 6 – Exploration for and Evaluation of 
Mineral Resources.   
 
IFRS 6 was issued in December 2004 as the culmination of a six-year project, 
initiated by the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) and later continued 
by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). The standard was to address 
accounting and disclosure issues and narrow the alternative accounting practices that are 
prevalent across the oil and gas and mining sectors.  The IASC’s project came as a belated 
response to frequent calls for the standardization of accounting and disclosure practices, 
which were fuelled by the distinctive characteristics and economic significance of the 
extractive industries, and the increasing need to compare financial statements across 
international borders without the variable effects of applying numerous industry accepted 
accounting practices (Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, 2001; Luther, 1996; Wise & Spear, 2000).   
 
When issued, IFRS 6 failed to address the key issue responsible for much of the 
disparity in extractive industries reporting, which concerns the methods used to account for 
pre-production costs. These costs, also known as exploration and evaluation costs, comprise 
some of the most significant expenditures incurred by extractive industries companies, with 
costs often exceeding hundreds of millions of dollars annually. ExxonMobil for example, as 
the world’s largest petroleum company, spent US$27 billion on exploration in 2009 
(ExxonMobil Corporation, 2009). Exploration budgets are also significant even for the 
smaller companies, with Anadarko Petroleum Corporation, for example, spending US$1.3 
billion on exploration efforts during 2008 (Anadarko Petroleum Corporation, 2009). Given 
the millions of dollars that companies spend on pre-production activities, the way these 
costs are allocated in the accounting process is important and, over time, different industry 
practices have developed that produce significantly different accounting results 
(International Accounting Standards Committee, 2000; Katz, 1985; Nichols, 2012; Van 
Riper, 1994).  
 
The two main practices that are used to account for pre-production costs are known 
as the successful efforts method and the full cost method. While both methods are based on 
the historical cost concept of accounting, the key difference is the means by which successful 
and unsuccessful exploration ventures are treated in the accounts. The successful efforts 
method stipulates that costs relating to exploration and evaluation activities may be 
capitalised only if they relate to the successful discovery of petroleum or mineral reserves, 
with all costs relating to unsuccessful ventures to be expensed as incurred. The full cost 
method, however, permits all exploration and evaluation costs, whether related to successful 
or unsuccessful ventures, to be capitalised and written off against revenues from successful 
projects (Amernic, 1979; Flory & Grossman, 1978; ISAC 2000).  
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Although the successful efforts method is argued to be consistent with the 
accounting principles of matching and conservatism, the inherent uncertainty associated 
with exploration activities means that the income streams and asset balances of entities 
reporting under the successful efforts method can fluctuate significantly (Editorial, 1986; 
Frazier & Ingersoll, 1986). As a result, the successful efforts method is typically avoided by 
smaller companies and instead adopted by large entities that can afford to absorb the losses 
from unsuccessful exploration efforts (Frazier & Ingersoll, 1986). Smaller companies have 
historically favoured the full cost method (Amernic, 1979; Flory & Grossman, 1978; Frazier 
& Ingersoll, 1986). This is because the capitalization of both successful and unsuccessful 
ventures creates healthier asset balances and, by not having to write off unsuccessful 
exploration efforts, expenses are reduced and income is smoothed (Flory & Grossman, 1978; 
Ingersoll, 1986; IASC 2000).  
 
The effect of IFRS 6, despite the stated purpose of the IASC’s extractive industries 
project, was that it codified rather than narrowed existing practice. It did this by granting 
extractive industries companies an exemption from the provisions of other standards, such 
as IAS 8, Accounting Policies, Changes in Accounting Estimates and Errors, which would 
have required companies to use accounting methods consistent with the IASB’s Conceptual 
Framework definitions, recognition criteria and measurement concepts for assets, liabilities, 
income and expenses (IASB 2004b). If the provisions of the Framework, and thereby IAS 8, 
were followed, companies would have been required to follow the successful efforts method 
thus eliminating the full cost accounting practices. 
 
As noted, in her recent paper Nichols (2012, p.22) considers whether this outcome of 
the extractive industries project was a consequence of the “political clout” of industry 
constituents. Nichols (2012) also reviews the historical controversy surrounding these 
methods in the United States (US) oil and gas sector and likens this to the efforts of the 
international accounting standard setting to regulate accounting practice for the industry 
(Van Riper, 1994). In the US case, it was arguably political pressure from oil and gas 
industry constituents that contributed to the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s failure 
to eliminate full cost accounting (Flory & Grossman, 1978; Frazier & Ingersoll, 1986; 
Ingersoll, 1986; Solomons, 1978; Van Riper, 1994; Zeff, 1978) and both the full cost and the 
successful efforts methods are used by extractive industries entities to this day. When the 
IASC embarked on its extractive industries project in 1998, it reopened this issue at the 
international level and, once again, the successful efforts and full cost methods were under 
the spotlight and, once again, the standard setter failed to standardise accounting practices 
(IASC 2000). 
 
With the potential for politicisation of accounting standard setting processes well-
established (Fogarty, et al., 1994; Hope & Gray, 1982; Rappaport, 1977; Solomons, 1983; 
Walker, 1987; Walker & Robinson, 1993; Zeff, 1978, 2002), it is important to closely 
examine the international accounting standard setting process for the extractive industries, 
paying particular attention to the key players involved and the procedures by which the 
standard was developed. The following sections outline the due process procedures followed 
by the IASC/IASB when setting an international accounting standard, describe the key 
constituents involved in the process, and map the intricacies of one specific network of these 
constituents to provide support for the politicisation argument. 
  
The standard setting process 
 
The international accounting standard setting process for the extractive industries 
formally commenced in 1998 when the IASC added the extractive industries project to its 
agenda (IASC 1998). To lead the project, a Steering Committee was formed and the 
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Extractive Industries Issues Paper (hereafter the Issues Paper) was published in November 
2000 and made available for public comment until June 2001.  
 
The methods of accounting for pre-production activities were considered in Chapter 
Four of the Issues Paper, which contained a tentative view from the Steering Committee that 
accounting alternatives be removed and all companies required to report according to the 
successful efforts method. Constituents were asked to indicate their preferred method and 
comment letters were received from fifty-two respondents, many of these being 
multinational extractive industries companies and associated lobby groups. Of the thirty-
seven respondents who commented specifically on the successful efforts versus full cost 
issue, twenty-nine (seventy-eight percent) explicitly agreed with the treatment proposed by 
the Steering Committee. Interestingly, most of these supporters were large extractive 
industries enterprises that were already using the successful efforts method or by 
professional accounting firms that were representing the interests of their clients, which are 
these same large enterprises. While in the minority, some respondents expressed fervent 
opposition to the proposed elimination of the full cost method, the most significant of these 
opponents being the American Petroleum Institute and the UK Oil Industry Accounting 
Committee, the world’s largest extractive industry lobby groups, who argued that both the 
successful efforts and full cost methods should continue to be permitted under IFRS.  
 
Before address comment letters specifically, the institutional structure of the 
international accounting standard setting body should be highlighted so that the contextual 
relevance of the relationships between constituents and the standard setter are understood.  
Prior restructure of the IASC in 2001, funding to support the standard setting process came 
from three main sources: fees paid by Board members and by the International Federation 
of Accountants, profits made on IASC publications, and, importantly, voluntary 
contributions from companies and other organisations with an interest in the work of the 
IASC (IASC, 1999).  As part of the restructure, the IASC Foundation (IASCF) was formed 
and the IASB was to be supported primarily by private contributions of chartered 
accounting firms and international business enterprises (IASCF, 2001).  In order to secure a 
steady stream of funding, the IASCF established an “underwriter” class of supporter 
comprising major international financial and business organisations (IASCF, 2001, p.3).  
Underwriting companies were asked to make five-year pledges of monetary support to the 
IASB ranging from £100,000 and £200,000 per year.  In addition, other “supporters” make 
annual, undisclosed contributions to the IASB (IASCF, 2001).  At the inception of the 
restructured IASB, the (then) “Big 5” chartered accounting firms each pledged £1,000,000 
per annum, which comprised approximately one third of the IASB’s estimated operating 
budget (IASCF, 2001).  
 
Significantly, many of the financial supporters of the IASB’s standard setting 
programs also stand to gain, or lose, from the standards that the IASB promulgates, raising 
concerns over the potential for a dependency relationship between the IASB and its 
benefactors (Brown, 2004, 2006). In 2004 when the IFRS for the extractive industries was 
finally issued, the IASC Foundation reported that it received contributions totalling almost 
£10,000,000 from 186 corporations, associations, and other institutions, including 
extractive industries companies such as the Anglo American Group, BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto, 
(then) Conoco Inc, Exxon Mobil, and Petrochina (IASCF 2005). 
 
To outline the intricacies of the connections between constituents of the standard 
setting process and the IASB, the contribution of three constituents is presented in the 
following sections: international accounting firm KPMG, independent oil and gas 
exploration company Kerr McGee, and UK-based petroleum industry lobby group the Oil 
Industry Accounting Committee (OIAC). It should be noted that this cross-section of players 
is presented as just one example of the several, similar networks of constituents that 
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permeated the standard setting process for the extractive industries (for other examples see 
Cortese et al. 2007, 2010). 
 
IASC/IASB and KPMG 
 
The five accounting firms already identified as major contributors to the IASC/IASB 
were PwC, KPMG, Ernst & Young, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, and Arthur Andersen. These 
accounting firms have traditionally provided important resources to the IASC/IASB in the 
form of staff, technical expertise, and members for many of the IASC/IASB’s committees. As 
well as providing financial, personnel, and technical support, the chartered accounting firms 
serve an important liaison function between the IASC/IASB and their clients. Georgiou 
(2004) noted that a considerable number of companies lobby the IASB through their 
external auditor thus requiring extensive consultation between auditor and client in order to 
ensure that client interests are accurately represented.   
 
As noted, the extractive industries project was led by a Steering Committee. The 
Chairman of this committee was Ken Spencer, a partner of KPMG in Australia and also 
former Chairman of the Australian Accounting Standards Board. Another Committee 
member, John A. Gordon, was seconded to the project from the Canadian office of KPMG 
(IASC 2000). In its response to the Issues Paper, KPMG argued that there is no “right or 
wrong” (KPMG, 2001, p.5) answer to the debate over successful efforts versus full cost 
accounting, and that the method of accounting chosen should be that which most accurately 
reflects the results of management decisions (KPMG, 2001). Although KPMG indicated its 
preference for a method consistent with the successful efforts concept, it did recognise the 
relevance of the full cost method for a “significant body of companies” and the smaller, 
independent companies in particular (KPMG, 2001, p.5):   
 
KPMG considers that there is no right or wrong answer to the debate about 
which method of accounting is preferable. The arguments made in favour of 
each are that they properly reflect the way in which particular businesses are 
managed and so present most appropriately the results of management 
decisions. It is KPMG’s experience that this is the case. The way that decisions 
are made on prospecting and exploration activity by major companies and by 
the smaller “independent” sector can be very different. 
 
We encourage the IASB to address the issue by first considering the extent to 
which the Framework provides an appropriate basis for accounting for the 
extractive industries, particularly the application of the Framework definition of 
an asset and the recognition criteria to prospecting, exploration and 
development activities. 
 
In their comment letter, KPMG also suggested a number of possible ways forward 
for the IASB in this matter.  Interestingly, their first suggestion was that the standard setter 
“codify current practice” so that the various accounting treatments could be retained 
(KPMG, 2001, p.5).1  
 
IASC/IASB, KPMG and Kerr-McGee 
 
Kerr-McGee, acquired by Anadarko Petroleum Corporation in 2006, was one of the 
world’s largest independent oil and gas companies (Kerr-McGee, 2006). Immediately before 
                                                         
1 Given the presence of the Canadian KPMG partner on the Steering Committee, it is also worth noting that the 
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants provided a submission in response to the Issues Paper in which it 
argued that the mining industry, an important segment of the Canadian economy, would be adversely affected by 
a move to successful efforts accounting because of the prevalence of the full cost method among the junior 
mining companies (Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants, 2001). 
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it was acquired, Kerr McGee spent US$407 million on exploration and evaluation activities, 
which were accounted for using the full cost method (Kerr-McGee, 2005). In 2006 when the 
acquisition took place, Anadarko also used the full cost method to account for its pre-
production activities (Anadarko Petroleum Corporation, 2006). During 2007, however, the 
company switched its method of accounting for oil and gas exploration and development 
activities to the successful efforts method (Anadarko Petroleum Corporation, 2007). This 
change in accounting policy required an adjustment to the financial statements for the 2006 
reporting year, resulting in a downward restatement of income by US$322 million and a 
decrease of US$2,265 million in reported retained earnings, which represented twenty-five 
percent of the total retained earnings of the company (Anadarko Petroleum Corporation, 
2007). Interestingly, the auditor for Anadarko is KPMG. 
 
Kerr-McGee participated passively in the international accounting standard setting 
process however their comment letter in response to the Issues Paper was short but telling: 
“we wish formally to note our support for the representations made by the Oil Industry 
Accounting Committee in response to the…Issues Paper”. That Kerr-McGee was content to 
leave the ‘heavy lifting’ to the OIAC underscores the important role played by lobby groups 
in the standard setting process. 
 
IASC/IASB, KPMG, Kerr-McGee, and the OIAC 
 
Like the American Petroleum Institute in the US, the OIAC is the UK-based lobby 
group for the extractive industries.  It was established in 1984 in order to represent the oil 
and gas industry in various accounting forums and to assist the industry with matters 
relating accounting standards interpretation and application (OIAC 2011). The Committee 
itself has just fifteen members but represents the interests of all companies engaged in the 
upstream sector of the oil and gas industry. All of the Big 4 accounting firms are members of 
the Committee as well as representatives from major corporations such as BP and Shell and 
smaller independent companies including Premier Oil and Osprey Oil & Gas Ltd (OIAC 
2011). 
 
In a comment letter remarkably similar to that submitted by KPMG (see excerpt 
above), the OIAC also considered there to be no “right or wrong” (OIAC 2001, p.6) answer 
to the debate over successful efforts versus full cost accounting, and that the method chosen 
should be that which most accurately reflects the results of management decisions (OIAC 
2001).  The OIAC did, however, stress the importance of retaining both methods, arguing 
that:  
OIAC is of the view that it would be wrong to restrict companies to using one 
method of allocating costs.  The arguments made in favour of each are that they 
properly reflect the way in which particular businesses are managed and so 
present most appropriately the results of management decisions. It is OIAC’s 
experience that this is very much the case. The way that decisions are made on 
prospecting and exploration activity by major corporations and by the smaller 
“independent” sector can be very different.  
 
The majority of UK listed upstream companies account under the full cost 
method. In practice OIAC considers that the choice of selecting either successful 
efforts of full cost…enables companies to properly reflect their particular 
decision taking process in their financial statements, and therefore should be 
retained (OIAC 2001, p.2).   
 
The similarity of the statements made by OIAC and KPMG, particularly in the initial 
paragraphs, which are almost identical, suggests that a significant consultation process had 
taken place between this lobby group and KPMG in order to represent consistent views to 
the IASB. 
 Cortese – Volume 11, Issue 2 (2013)  
 
 
 
© JNBIT Vol.11, Iss.2 (2013)  
 
 
54 
The connectedness of these three constituents, with each other and with the IASB, is 
discussed in the following section in order to strengthen the case for the politicisation of the 
international accounting standard setting process for the extractive industries. 
 
Influencing the “new” accounting standard 
 
It is important that the involvement of the three constituents, just one example of 
several similar networks, be critiqued in order to make sense of the outcome of the 
international accounting standard setting process, IFRS 6. When the standard setting 
process commenced in 1998, the Steering Committee noted that an explicit aim of the 
project would be to identify and address the diversity of accounting practices used by 
extractive industries companies (IASC 2000). With the publication of the Issues Paper, the 
Steering Committee undertook to review public responses and use these to develop an 
Exposure Draft that would also be made available for public comment (IASC 2000).  The 
comments received in respect of the Exposure Draft would be reviewed, after which a final 
standard would be produced for consideration by the restructured IASC Board.   
 
In outlining its anticipated program, however, the IASC incorporated a caveat that it 
was in the midst of a restructure and that the new IASC Board would have to “have to decide 
its own agenda and priorities” (IASC 2000, p.5). Following the restructure, the IASB put the 
extractive industries project on hold, announcing in July 2001 that it would restart the 
project only when agenda time permitted. By September 2002, the IASB had decided that it 
was not feasible to complete a comprehensive project in time for adoption by entities in 
2005. In place of a comprehensive accounting standard, the IASB issued Exposure Draft 6 
Exploration for and Evaluation of Mineral Resources (ED 6) in January 2004 (IASCF 
2004). This exposure draft outlined only limited changes to existing practice because it was 
intended that a “more complete consideration of the accounting issues” would be 
forthcoming and therefore the “interim” accounting standard, IFRS 6, should not require 
major changes that would cause “unnecessary disruption” for reporting entities (IASCF 
Heaphy, 2004; 2004, p.9). In its basis for conclusions, the IASB granted extractive 
industries entities an exemption from meeting some of the requirements of other IFRSs and 
the IASB Conceptual Framework, permitting entities to continue to use their existing 
accounting policies:    
 
The [draft] IFRS proposed to exempt entities from some requirements of other 
IFRSs and the IASB Framework. Instead of requiring entities engaged in the exploration for 
and evaluation of mineral resources to consider the various sources of authoritative 
requirements and guidance in developing an accounting policy for such activities, the [draft] 
IFRS permits those entities the alternative of continuing their existing accounting treatment 
in specified circumstances. In particular, paragraph 4 provides that an entity may continue 
to account for exploration and evaluation assets in accordance with the accounting policies 
applied in its most recent annual financial statements (IASCF 2004). In sum, the proposed 
standard would permit the use of both the successful efforts and full cost methods to be 
used by extractive industries entities when accounting for their pre-production activities. 
Unsurprisingly, there was little opposition to these proposals and the provisions of ED 6 
were eventually incorporated into IFRS 6 on 9 December 2004 (IASB 2004a).  
 
This decision by the IASB is consistent with the recommendations put forward by 
KPMG in their response to the Issues Paper, which suggested that current practice be 
“codified” (KPMG, 2001, p.5). It is also consistent with the representations of the OIAC, 
which argued for the retention of the full cost and successful efforts methods. This certainly 
adds to arguments for the politicisation of the international accounting standard setting 
process for the extractive industries. Recall that each of the (now) Big 4 accounting firms 
provide £1,000,000 per annum in funding to the IASB (IASCF 2001).  KPMG is, of course, 
 Cortese – Volume 11, Issue 2 (2013)  
 
 
 
© JNBIT Vol.11, Iss.2 (2013)  
 
 
55 
one of these firms.  The Steering Committee that led the extractive industries project was 
chaired by a KPMG partner and another KPMG partner from the Canadian arm of the firm 
also served on the Committee. The OIAC’s membership also includes representation from 
KPMG, as well as each of the other big accounting firms. The OIAC represents the views of 
hundreds of oil and gas companies throughout the UK and the rest of the world, which gives 
it enormous power as a lobbying force. Also significant is the fact that the submissions and 
recommendations put forward to the extractive industries Steering Committee by KPMG 
and OIAC were, in parts, identical. Further, the final accounting standard issued by the 
IASB was consistent with the KPMG and OIAC recommendations. While this paper analyses 
the connections and representations of just three key players, similar arguments and 
connectedness exist between several of the respondents (see, for example, Cortese et al. 
2007, 2010). The end result is that, significantly, one of the world’s most important 
economic sectors is yet to have its accounting practices adequately regulated by the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) (Cortese et al. 2010; Nichols, 2012). 
 
Conclusion Summary 
 
This paper has used an example of three key players involved in the international 
accounting standard setting process for the extractive industries to further the argument for 
politicisation of accounting standard setting. The analysis of submissions made by KPMG, 
Kerr McGee, and the OIAC, and their interactions with the IASC/IASB and each other, has 
highlighted the web of relationships that is characteristic of standard setting process and 
that arguably contributed to the final outcome, IFRS 6, being a codification of the existing 
practices. This places in doubt the proclaimed transparency and independence of the IASB 
as a standard setting institution, and although it is widely acknowledged that the accounting 
standard setting process is political, this research highlights the source, nature and effect of 
this politicisation.  
 
While the focus of this study has been on the IASB, on the development of one 
accounting standard, on the responses made to one Issues Paper, and on only a cross-
section only of those responses, it does present opportunities for further research. For 
example other issues related to the accounting for extractive operations could be considered 
such as practices used to account for removal and restoration expenses or the agenda setting 
processes of the IASB. A useful supplement to this study would also be an analysis from the 
perspective of an ‘insider’ who is privy to the machinations of the standard setter.   
 
The potential for the IASB to be ‘captured’ by those companies that are intended to 
be bound by the standards it issues is of particular concern given that the IASB claims to be 
an independent organization acting in the public interest seeking worldwide diffusion of its 
accounting standards that will, ultimately, affect global capital markets. 
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